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Abstract: In the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) 
negotiation, this article questions to what extent legitimacy matters in sovereign debt 
governance and, if so, under what conditions. How can one recognize legitimate 
governance instruments when informality of governance process and practice is regarded 
as an important goal?  This article sees the implementation of SDGs in the global 
financial arena as facilitated by legitimate normative instruments that reflect general 
public interest and demonstrate respect for human rights.  The implementation of 
informal norms should give rise to substantive outcomes that are both sustainable and 
legitimate, thereby complementing the procedural dimension of any normative instrument. 
This article evaluates this assumption by reviewing the development and implementation 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s Principles on 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. We conclude that legitimacy is not only 
a key component in the construction of well-grounded informal laws, but also forms part 
of a desirable legal framework for the implementation of SDGs. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Sovereign debt governance is an important field in the realm of 
sustainable development, yet states have not formally agreed to bind 
themselves to rules ensuring a sustainable global financial path.  In the 
preparation of the post-2015 Development Agenda and the Third 
International Conference on Financing for Development to be held in July 
2015 in Addis Ababa, the international community faces reconciling the 
imperatives of sovereign states that need financing to provide the conditions 
necessary for the well-being of their citizens with the purely profit-oriented 
imperatives of financial markets.  At the same time, these markets provide 
financial space for sovereign borrowers with rapid, albeit risky, development 
perspectives.  This reconciliatory exercise amounts to a search for legitimacy 
in sovereign debt governance. 
                                                     
† Marie Sudreau is Sovereign Debt Expert at UNCTAD. The authors wish to extend their gratitude 
for the comments to the drafts of this paper received from Jean d'Aspremont.  The views and conclusions 
reflected in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions 
with which the authors are affiliated. 
† Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky is the U.N. Independent Expert on Foreign Debt and Human Rights.  He 
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Legitimacy—which is when rules have moral force because of their 
lawfulness1—is a concept generally associated with identity, interest, and 
practice, or with an institution’s norms, rules, and principles.  Like all 
concepts meant to express an objective reality, legitimacy is the fruit of a 
balancing act between subjective financial interests and a general interest in 
human rights. 2  This balancing act, frequently expressed in considerations 
linked with sustainability, ultimately leads to a compromise that is 
acceptable to societal stakeholders.  
The question of legitimacy in sovereign debt governance is relevant 
not only in relation to the authorities responsible for regulating this field but 
also to the normative instruments that are used for this purpose.  This article 
does not focus on the intrinsic quality of authorities but rather on what they 
produce and how,3 thereby implying a reflection on norm properties rather 
than institutional legitimizing mechanisms.  This methodological decision is 
grounded in the determination that the definition of international authority 
and related acceptance, especially in regard to debt issues, goes well beyond 
the definition of state actors.  Currently, international authorities are defined 
more by their production than by their classical legal definition.  In practice, 
many of the international public authorities making financial decisions with 
worldwide impact would not pass any Westphalian test. 
Having defined the scope of this article within those boundaries, one 
would be in a position to assess the legitimacy of financial decisions made 
by lenders and borrowers, irrespective of their type of governments.  The 
same question can be answered according to the criteria of input and output 
legitimacy, regardless of the actor.  Under this framework, Saddam Hussein 
could have made exceptionally legitimate decisions when he channeled 
international funds towards the needs of his population,4 while some of the 
loans taken—for example, by a democratic European state and its lenders—
could be considered illegitimate in light of the recent events in the eurozone 
and their impact on the population.  As the above discussion indicates, any 
legitimacy assessment is complex and involves procedural and substantive 
components that can be deeply entwined. 
This article questions the relevance and understanding of legitimacy 
as applied to informal normative initiatives in sovereign debt governance, 
                                                     
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1040 (10th ed. 2014). 
2 See SIMONE PETER, PUBLIC INTEREST AND COMMON GOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ( 2012). 
3 See, e.g., Jean D’Aspremont & Eric De Brabandère, The Complementary Faces of Legitimacy in 
International Law: The Legitimacy of Origin and the Legitimacy of Exercise, 34 FORDHAM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 101, 101 (2010). 
4 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report on Financial Complicity:  Lending to States Engaged in 
Gross Human Rights Violations, 28th Sess., Mar. 2-27, 2015, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/59 (Dec. 22, 2014). 
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which will ultimately facilitate the Sustainable Development Goals 
(“SDGs”).  In doing so, this article attempts to include the widest range of 
possible options in reviewing elements that could give rise to legitimacy in 
this context.  It argues that in addition to the procedural (ex ante) dimension 
of legitimacy, substantive outcomes stemming from the implementation of 
informal norms also constitute an important dimension of norm legitimacy 
in sovereign debt governance.  This, in turn, should facilitate the 
achievement of the SDGs.  The promotion of macro-economic and financial 
sustainability is embedded in the realization of substantive outcomes.  This 
latter component of normative legitimacy makes well-grounded informal 
norms central to the development of responsible financial practices in the 
field of sovereign debt.  This article looks to how this practice manifested in 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) 
Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing 5  (“the 
Principles”)—a specific and informal normative initiative in sovereign debt 
governance—and whether this makes any difference in terms of 
effectiveness and actual acceptance by relevant stakeholders in sovereign 
debt governance.  
The scope of this article is limited to assessing the legitimacy of 
informal norms like the Principles in the field of sovereign debt governance. 
This assessment occurs while acknowledging that international finance 
dynamics are impacted by distributive tensions, there is a large space in 
which non-cooperative or abusive behavior is possible and even foreseeable, 
and an international treaty in this area is not realistic in the short- and mid-
term.  Yet even under these constraints, seeking procedural and substantive 
legitimacy through informal legal instruments could contribute to feasible, 
agreeable, and well-grounded rules in sovereign debt governance aimed at 
achieving the SDGs. 
Part II of this article provides context on the relationship between 
sovereign debt governance, legitimacy, and SDGs, and highlights the 
mutually reinforcing nature of legitimacy and sustainability in sovereign 
debt governance.  Part III analyzes the theoretical means of deriving 
legitimacy in sovereign debt governance.  Part IV provides a concrete 
example of how legitimacy may be assessed within the context of the 
Principles.  This article concludes by addressing some of the implications of 
our conclusions on the SDGs. 
                                                     
5 Press Release, U.N.C.T.A.D., UNCTAD Releases Consolidated Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Financing, U.N. Press Release (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.unctad.info/fr/Debt-
Portal/News-Archive/Our-News/UNCTAD-Releases-Consolidated-Principles-on-Responsible-Sovereign-
Financing-310112/. 
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOVEREIGN DEBT GOVERNANCE, 
LEGITIMACY, AND SDGS 
A.  Sovereign Debt and SDGs 
 
Unsustainable debt burdens compromise the full enjoyment of human 
rights, particularly economic, social, and cultural rights.6  In the case of 
sovereign insolvency, the development goals should be able to play a role in 
promoting human rights by protecting the population against unacceptable 
retrogressive measures and facilitating the economic conditions for 
sustainable, inclusive growth.7 
The post-2015 sustainable development agenda is currently being 
drafted, so its final version has not yet been determined.8  However, it has 
now been acknowledged that in contrast to the Millennium Development 
Goals (“MDGs”), the SDGs should not repeat the mistake of failing to 
differentiate between goals and financial measures required to fund those 
goals (as happened with Goal 8 on the Global Partnership).  The instruments 
to be approved in the forthcoming Third International Conference on 
Financing for Development should also facilitate the success of the future 
SDGs. 
The preparatory negotiations of this conference seem to indicate that 
there is a growing consensus around the fact that unsustainable debts 
threaten states’ efforts to fulfill their human rights obligations.9  One of the 
proposed ideas is to “adhere to UNCTAD Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing.” 10   These principles, in addition to 
similar guidelines promoting more responsible financial behaviors, would 
shape global sovereign debt governance in the direction of ensuring 
sustainable development. 
 
                                                     
6 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Resolutions and Decisions on the 
Mandate, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/IEDebt 
/Pages/Resolutions.aspx. 
7 Kunibert Raffer, A Sovereign Debt Overhang, Human Rights and the MDGs:  Legal Problems 
Through an Economist’s Lens, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 101 (Juan 
Pablo Bohoslavsky & Jernej Letnar Černič, eds. 2014). See International development financing: “It’s not 
just about more resources” – UN human rights expert, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (May 26, 2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16004&LangID=E. 
8 U.N. Economic and Social Council, Millennial Goals and Post-2015 Development Agenda, 
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/mdg.shtml. 
9 Rep. of Intergovernmental Comm. of Experts on Sustainable Dev. Fin., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.216/16, 
chapter 1, resolution 1 (Aug. 2014). 
10 U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Preparatory Process for the Third International 
Conference on Financing for Development, Annex E (Jan. 21, 2015). 




B. Why Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt Governance? 
 
Legitimacy is frequently treated as a side question—one only 
concerning to scholars, which should not interfere with the economic and 
financial considerations constituting the core of sovereign debt transactions.  
Legitimacy is a term that has been historically excluded from the vocabulary 
of sovereign debt restructurings because of a lack of legal grounding.  The 
legal and banking professions have a particular dislike for legitimacy 
questions because legitimacy is conceptual, not codified, and therefore 
unpredictable. The sovereign debt arena is predominantly occupied by actors 
who dislike legitimacy questions, and are also generally satisfied with the 
status quo.  
This conservative attitude is characterized by the weight of events and 
destructive patterns brought along with increased financial globalization.  
The eurozone debt crisis, the vulture fund litigation against African countries 
eroding the fiscal space generated under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (“HIPC”) Initiative, and the recent Argentine litigation saga11 
highlight a few marking episodes of sovereign debt governance issues, 
which require adequate—and thus legitimate—international regulation.  
One important development contributing to moving the lines of norm-
making in this area is the impact of individuals’ expectations and voices 
across nations (mostly though their governments and interest groups) asking 
for legitimate governance in sovereign debt.  As Professor Robert Howse 
points out, “sovereign debt crises are now a matter of intense public 
contestation and debate.  It is no longer a negotiation among small group of 
elite actors, governmental and private sector managers, lawyers, and 
international financial institutions’ officials where the broader social 
consequences are marginalized and the solutions regarded as technical.”12  
The media interest generated by these issues is directly linked to the threat of 
a vanishing welfare-state, which constitutes the incarnation of protection at 
the national level.13  Social aspirations therefore appear to be a key point in 
the growing claims not only for nations that are currently facing massive 
                                                     
11 NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 17 N.Y.3d 250 (2011). 
12 Robert Howse, Concluding Remarks in Light of International Law, in Sovereign Financing and 
International Law:  UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING (Carlos 
Espósito, Yuefen Li, & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, eds. 2013). 
13 FRANÇOIS EWALD, L’ETAT PROVIDENCE 2 (1986). 
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budget cuts but also for those fighting to make basic rights (e.g., access to 
education for all) a reality. 
From a structural perspective, the demand for legitimacy in sovereign 
debt governance is directly linked with the flexibility and informality that 
seems to be required in rapidly evolving and increasingly complex fields 
such as the global financial sector.  The recent attempt of the Group of 77 
(“G-77”) to promote the creation of a multilateral framework for debt 
restructuring processes through a U.N. General Assembly Resolution14 have 
created tensions between developed and developing countries, highlighting 
once again the challenge generated by the idea of formulating international 
formal law in this field.  The current governance of sovereign debt indeed 
reflects this challenge.  Some examples of international financial entities 
include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNCTAD, and 
the Paris Club—all institutions concerned with sovereign debt governance 
and constituted through international law—govern through informal means, 
including guidelines, informal discussions, and official deliberations (e.g., 
U.N. General Assembly).15  This is not to mention purely ad-hoc governing 
institutions such as the Group of 7 (“G7”) and Group of Twenty (“G20”), 
known to be some of the most important fora for decision-making and 
regulation on financial governance issues (though not specifically on 
sovereign debt).  Most instruments governing sovereign debt at the global 
level are produced by informal international means and are considered soft 
law;16 the relevance of their legitimacy is paramount but not only in relation 
to their theoretical grounding.  Legitimate laws exert a compliance pull17 
compelling states to implement policies in line with the public interest.18  
This in turn affects people who tend to be more honest when they are 
reminded of the morality of their actions.19  Informal law is taken seriously if 
it is persuasive enough to influence the behavior of the involved 
stakeholders, affect the interpretation, application, and development of other 
rules of law, or become recognized as a legal rule. 
                                                     
14 G.A. Res 68/304, U.N. Doc A/Res 68/304 (Sept. 14, 2014). 
15 See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance - And Not Trade, 13 J. INT’L 
ECON. L., 623 (2010). 
16 Jean D’Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials, 
19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1075, 1075-76 (2008). 
17 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 
1832 (2002). 
18 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 
U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 482-83 (2005).   
19 DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 231 
(2010).   
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The fact that sovereign debt contracts constitute the preferred means 
of regulating sovereign debt transactions does not take away the political 
component of such transactions, nor the necessity of having legitimate rules 
or principles guiding sovereign debt practices at the international level. 
 
C. Legitimacy and SDGs 
 
This article makes an explicit link between the need to give a greater 
consideration to legitimacy issues in the context of sovereign debt 
governance and the SDGs.  In this respect, a few remarks should be made. 
First, legitimacy is not inherent in sustainability; not everything that is 
sustainable is legitimate and vice versa.  Second, SDGs constitute an 
objective, not a norm.  Thus, the analysis that is undertaken in this article 
does not apply to these goals as such but rather focuses on the legal 
instruments to achieve them.  Therefore, this article addresses the legitimacy 
of norms in the international sovereign debt field that should be desirable or 
functional for the purpose of implementing SDGs.  Third, while 
sustainability constitutes an important financial dimension of what needs to 
be achieved in terms of development, SDGs cannot be reduced to the 
concept of sustainability alone.  The SDGs embody a global will and spirit 
to embrace a common path that puts the well-being of individuals in 
harmony with their environment and avoids self-destructive patterns.  This 
spirit can be associated with legitimate procedures and outcomes, which, as 
argued here, in turn constitute the defining components of legitimate 
informal norms at the international level.  The outcome orientation of 
informal norms in sovereign debt governance is likely to make SDGs more 
attainable.  More compelling and efficient norms should make a difference 
to achieve development goals. 
III. LEGITIMACY IN SOVEREIGN DEBT GOVERNANCE 
A. Sources of Legitimacy and Sovereign Debt Governance 
 
The increasing demand for legitimacy in sovereign debt governance 
runs parallel to the evolution of international law. 20   The increasing 
production of informal norms at the international level is directly associated 
with the need to protect both the sovereignty of sovereign borrowers and to 
                                                     
20 MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 170-
206 (2013) (Waibel points out the difficulty that sovereign creditors face in obtaining protection under 
international law). 
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adapt to the fast changing terms of debt contracts in line with market 
evolutions.   
The sources of legitimacy in international law are also shifting 
because of the proliferation of these informal norms.  This field has indeed 
witnessed an increase of scholarship about the sources of authority and 
normative means affecting behaviors at all levels of society.21  Scholars have 
attempted to describe this shift in many ways.  Professor Anne-Marie 
Slaughter talked about the emergence of sub-national cross border networks 
of authorities (including diplomats, judges, legislators, etc.) that enable the 
creation of norms amongst these networks to form global governance.22  In 
the mid-2000s, legal scholars began questioning the sources of international 
law in an attempt to open them to more informal normative undertakings, 
thereby finally attempting to mirror the undergoing social evolution.23  Such 
transformation brought along an additional way of legitimizing international 
normative undertakings in the form of ex-post assessment.24  
Building on this research, this section seeks to provide more insight 
into the sources of legitimacy in the field of sovereign debt, which is 
characterized by informal norm-making.  This task involves assessing the 
role of formal international law within the field of sovereign debt to clarify 
whether the sources of legitimacy embedded in traditional sources of 
international law do not also apply to this field.  If this hypothesis is verified, 
it is worth inquiring whether informal lawmaking can borrow from formal 
lawmaking processes in the creation of its own means of legitimization. 
 
1. Formal Law and Consent-Based Legitimacy 
 
The rules characterizing formal international law, and from which 
legitimacy is derived, are well known: the Vienna Convention, customary 
international law, and the general principles of international law.  The rules, 
requiring express and explicit consent are (mostly) stated in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.  However, these have a limited 
significance.  Since international normative initiatives, especially in 
financial governance, tend to manifest in the absence of formal agreement 
                                                     
21 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).   
22 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005). 
23 JOSÉ E ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 586-650 (2006). 
24 Nico Krisch, Liquid Authority: Institutions, Law, and Legitimacy in Global Governance, 
Dasturzada Dr Jal Pavry Memorial Lecture in International Relations, Oxford University (2012) (audio 
recording available at http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/podcast-series/2012-dasturzada-dr-jal-pavry-memorial-
lecture-in-international-relations.html). 
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between parties, 25  contractual standards are not applicable.  Formal 
international law can also materialize in the form of customary international 
law and general principles of international law.  These strands of law have 
their own legitimizing standards, although they differ on the matter of 
consent manifestation. 
Customary international law is derived from state practices and the 
legal belief that these are consistent with the law.26  In practice, this entails 
determining whether a practice constitutes generally accepted law, and then 
ascertaining whether there is consistency with that law.  The key issue 
implicated with identifying legitimizing instruments is that the criteria used 
to identify these practices are problematic and subject to debate.  This is 
indeed one of the most controversial issues among international law 
scholars, who are trying to determine whether such criteria should be 
backward-looking or forward-looking, and whether opinio juris is even 
necessary for the enactment of customary law independent from state 
practices.27  In addition to this problem, the lack of recognized state practices 
in the field of sovereign debt governance makes the examination of 
customary law legitimizing standards particularly complex. 28 
The creation of general principles of international law29 relies mainly 
on legal comparison and judicial application of domestic rules, with an 
inherent universal logic deemed to go beyond cultural disparities.  The 
approach used is analytical and has to take into account the rationale behind 
the way domestic law responds to a particular problem.  This requires an 
intrinsic evaluation of the principles founded in domestic systems that 
provide the best solution for the case, rather than a mechanical or statistical 
search of predominant rules.30   General principles of international law can 
sometimes rely on judicial decisions, which are considered secondary 
sources.  Even in this context, it is worth noting that case law in the debt 
area is rather limited, mixed, and sometimes contradictory.31 
Not only is formal law not easily applicable to the issues that emerge 
in sovereign debt governance, but also the elements necessary to create such 
law are too sporadic to claim its existence on a consistent basis.  Thus 
                                                     
25 Brummer, supra note 15, at 630. 
26 Mitu Gulati, How Do Courts Find International Custom? (May 30, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors). 
27 See generally 21 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1 (2010) (special issue discussing debate); Symposium, 
The Role of Opinio Juris in Customary International Law, Duke-Geneva Institute in Transnational Law 
(July 12-13, 2013). 
28 See WAIBEL, supra note 20. 
29 See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
30 TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 38 (2d ed.1999). 
31 See WAIBEL, supra note 20. 
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informal law in sovereign debt governance is both necessary and potentially 
legitimate.  There is a possibility that informal law may borrow from 
legitimate sources found in formal law's creative processes such as 
systematic observation of domestic practices and rules, legal comparison, 
and abstract transposition into principles. 
 
2.  Informal Law and Other Sources of Legitimacy 
 
Beyond consent, the sources of legitimacy in international law can be 
ex-ante for procedural or input legitimacy (e.g., transparency, participation, 
representation) and ex-post for substantive legitimacy (e.g., results of 
governance and sustainability, respect for equity, human rights, etc.).  Both 
are subject to public perceptions, also called the sociological dimension of 
legitimacy.32  This dimension is discussed here through examples of how 
stakeholders received the Principles.33  
The differences in using legitimizing sources for formal and informal 
law must to be acknowledged.  In the case of formal law, the comparative 
methodology is applied in a judicial context involving a specific 
institutionalized channel with means of enforcement.  In the case of informal 
law, however, this happens in an informal context that mostly involves 
experts relying on their knowledge of domestic practices and their beliefs as 
to what the law should be like for the common good.34  The deliberation 
process is thus fed by this knowledge and belief.  Hence, without conferring 
upon them a law-making role, experts and scholars are of crucial importance 
in the creation of informal law.  In some cases, informal law can also be 
strengthened by a consistent legal effort to show how its rules are being 
implemented on a systematic basis at the domestic level.  This effort 
constitutes an important enhancer of informal law’s legitimacy without being 
essential to its creation, which is unlike formal law when embodied in 
general principles.  Indeed, the effectiveness of soft law is translated, ex-
post, through the exemplification of implementation.  Here too, the 
deliberation process is enabled by and gains value through this systematic 
legal approach, which grounds discussions into reality.  Comparable 
methodological traits can thus be used in different ways to foster the 
                                                     
32 See Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations (Aug. 1, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900289 (identifies normative and 
sociological legitimacy). 
33  See infra Part IV. 
34 Incidentally, reliance on knowledge of state practices and belief that what is suggested 
(normatively) is in the common good i.e. respects the intent of the law, recalls the criteria used by lawyers 
to determine customary law.  See Krisch, supra note 24. 
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legitimate process of international law’s creation both on formal and 
informal planes.  In the case of informal law, the consideration of domestic 
rules filters through expertise, deliberation, and effectiveness.  As Professor 
Anne Peters stated, “scientific legitimacy is not sufficient for the exercise of 
public authority”; norms need to be socially necessary as reflected not only 
by the participation of the affected people but also by the effectiveness of 
these norms, also known as the substantive aspect.35 
Due to the scarcity of formal legal sources specifically applicable to 
debt issues and the negative effect of debt problems on the provision of 
global public goods, this article mainly draws on the International Public 
Authority theory.  This theory focuses on international normative 
undertakings having a public effect and thus being receptive to politics of 
de-formalization of international law.36  This choice translates an attempt to 
be sufficiently flexible and broad to cover the actions and consequences that 
are relevant in the study of norm legitimacy in sovereign debt governance.37  
In the context of such theory and based on normative properties, three 
elements can be used to assess the procedural legitimacy of exercises of 
international public authority: a) expertise and knowledge that feed the 
informal law instrument; b) intensive deliberation around the existence, 
contents, scope, and goal of the principles; and c) the degree of effectiveness 
of the principles (grounded in domestic sources). 38   Other sociological 
elements are based on public perception and rely on perceived participatory 
quality and effectiveness.  Relying on perceptions, the latter elements are at 
the crossroad between procedural and substantive legitimacy. 
As to substantive aspects of norm-making legitimacy, we need to turn 
to the purpose of the law in order to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and 
sustainability of the norm at stake.  In doing so, we run into questions of 
morality, ethics, and objectives such as fairness, justice, and the public 
interest.  Such objectives are then translated into policies and norms, which 
are likely to have an impact on subjects.39  Legitimate international norms 
are those which not only have such impact, but also create the conditions of 
efficient policy outcomes in relation to the objectives.  Such objectives are 
ideals embodying the general interest.  It is thus in their nature to be general 
                                                     
35 Anne Peters, Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 533, 539 (2013). 
36 Armin Von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public 
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GER. L. J. 1375, 1386 
(2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1348809. 
37 Other standards used in the assessment of legitimacy tend to refer to institutions (e.g. 
accountability) and are not applicable here.   
38 Helen Keller, Codes of Conduct and Their Implementation: The Question of Legitimacy, in 194 
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219, 266-270 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2008). 
39 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2005). 
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and subject to interpretation.  Deciding on the objectives or ideals against 
which to assess normative undertakings is the first step in evaluating 
substantive legitimacy. 
A basic—but important—objective is to acknowledge an outcome 
orientation governing sovereign debt contracting, which requires that 
sovereign actions (such as borrowing and lending) be in citizens’ interest.40  
This idea is based on a notion of sovereignty intrinsically linked to human 
rights41 and the erga omnes (rights or obligations owed towards all) effect of 
human rights obligations so that the impact of sovereign debt over states’ 
capacities to promote and protect human rights is not something (legally) 
unfamiliar to lenders. 
Paying increasing attention to human rights should have spillover 
effects on sovereign debt standards, development goals, and the means to 
achieve them.  Sovereign financing is crucial for promoting and protecting 
citizens’ human rights, the link between sovereign debt and human rights 
becomes relevant and potent in terms of legitimacy.42  This seems to be 
corroborated by the fact that in 2012 the United Nations Human Rights 
Council endorsed the Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human 
Rights.43 
Jus cogens norms44 are recognized as those prevailing over all others 
and as such, could theoretically be used as objectives.45  The issue here is 
that these norms are in constant evolution and there is no consensus on what 
they encapsulate.46  Moreover, with the only exception of situations in which 
an authoritarian government engaged in a systematic campaign of human 
                                                     
40 See ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, REPUTATION, AND LEGITIMACY IN 
MODERN FINANCE (2014); see also Anne Peters, Humanity as A&O of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 
524 (2009). 
41 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 866, 875 (1990). 
42 See U.N. Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, Towards a Multilateral Legal 
Framework for Debt Restructuring: Six Human Rights Benchmarks States Should Consider (Jan. 25, 2015), 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/IEDebt/Pages/ViewsIEConventiontoregulate 
debt.aspx 
43 Human Rights Council Res. 20/10, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 20th Sess., (June 18-July 6, 
2012), A/HRC/RES 20/0 (July 18, 2012). 
44 Jus cogens norms transform primordial social values into legal imperatives through judicial 
determination. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “The Concept of Jus Cogens in 
International Law” Lagonissi Conference: Papers and Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1967): 11. 
45 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (A treaty 
between two states is void if it is in conflict with peremptory norms.  Given the universal applicability of 
jus cogens norms, this principle is indeed not limited to treaties but it also applies to contracts between 
states and privates). 
46 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical Norms,  The Role of 
Ethics in International Law  89 (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2011).   
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rights abuses is supported financially, jus cogens standards are not applied to 
debt standards because they are not relevant in the context of sovereign debt 
governance.  Instead, international human rights law seems to offer a 
broader and more skillful set of substantive criteria against which 
substantive legitimacy may be assessed, 47  as suggested by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council in 201148 and 2012.49  The recent Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights seem to corroborate this view. 
In order to gain normative efficiency, the first step of identifying 
quantifiable objectives needs to be complemented by a second step entailing 
some form of monitoring.  With legitimacy, for good or bad reasons, 
contestation seems to be the most significant form of monitoring. 50  
Perceived illegitimacy is indeed a strong catalyst for change through popular 
contestation.  Still, contestation often is a response to the implementation of 
a policy translated into a norm as opposed to a response to the norm itself.  
In monitoring the concerned norms, attention should be devoted to assessing 
not only their effectiveness, but also their sustainability. 
IV. ASSESSING THE PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND 
BORROWING 
A. Legitimacy Through Expertise, Stakeholders’ Participation, and 
Deliberation 
 
This section examines whether the Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing comply with the selected elements of 
international legitimacy.  As far as input legitimacy is concerned, let us 
examine expertise, stakeholder participation, and deliberation one by one. 
The level of expertise required in the formulation of the Principles 
constituted a fundamental pillar of this normative undertaking. The 
Principles have been drafted by an expert group of highly regarded 
professionals in this field. 51   Legal and economic minds coming from 
reputed universities and private law firms in the field of sovereign debt 
restructuring were particularly active in the drafting process.  Experts relied 
                                                     
47 BOGDANDI ET AL., supra note 31. 
48 See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, 17th Sess. May 30-June 17 2011, A/HRC/RES/17/4  (July 6, 
2011). 
49 See Human Rights Council Res. 20/10, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 20th Sess., June 18-
July 6, 2012, A/HRC/20/L.17 (July 22, 2012). 
50 Christian Reus-Smit, International Crises of Legitimacy, 44 INT'L POL. 157, 159 (2007).  
51 For detailed information about this UNCTAD initiative, see http://www.unctad.info/en/Debt-
Portal/.   
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both on their scientific and theoretical knowledge, and their professional 
experience relating to sovereign debt contracting practices all over the 
world.  The participation of the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club as 
observers meant that the articulation of concepts—and ultimately, 
principles—going into the draft was always kept in check with the reality 
and experience of lending practices at the multilateral and bilateral levels.  
Expertise was communicated through regular face-to-face meetings and 
through rounds of written comments, thereby offering prepared thoughts in 
addition to the spontaneous remarks made during meetings.  
In terms of participation in the drafting process, the members of this 
expert group were carefully selected to reflect all the parties affected by 
sovereign lending and borrowing and to be as inclusive as possible.  The 
idea behind this selection process was to combine the wide-ranging views of 
all the stakeholders involved and potentially impacted by irresponsible 
sovereign debt governance.  Given the importance of basic taxpayers’ 
interests in this issue, members of international civil society were adequately 
represented.  In fact, Afrodad, Eurodad, Latindad, Jubilee Network, 
Erlassjahr, and Slug were all invited to be part of the expert group.  Private 
interests were also heard through bond markets associations’ representatives 
(International Capital Market Association and EMTA) and private lawyers.  
Giving a voice to such disparate stakeholders could theoretically have 
prevented any kind of consensus on the formulation of the Principles.  
However, faced with the urgency to deal with the absence of universal 
principles in the field and with the opportunity to address different ideas 
with other stakeholders’ realities, participants engaged in meaningful 
discussions rooted in mutual tolerance.   
As to the process through which the Principles received support, the 
adopted formula was deliberation based on extensive consultation.  The 
consensus building process began with the drafting exercise among the 
members of the expert group meeting in which they exposed the points to be 
addressed in the principles.  Based on these points, the secretariat elaborated 
a draft of the Principles.  During 2011 and 2012, six regional consultative 
meetings with countries took place in Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Luanda, 
Geneva, Jeddah, and Punta Cana in order to get governmental feedback from 
U.N. member states on the design and the possible implementation process.  
Around seventy-five countries provided their views.  After a series of 
bilateral and high level regional governmental consultations and subsequent 
refinements introduced by the project’s Expert Group, the consolidated 
version of the Principles was launched in Doha in April 2012 on the 
occasion of UNCTAD XIII, inaugurating the phase of endorsement and 
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implementation.  To date, twelve countries have explicitly endorsed the 
Principles. 
Deliberation thus took place through several means.  First, once 
launched into the public sphere, all delegations were informed and given the 
opportunity to reply and comment on the Principles.52  Second, in regional 
consultative meetings, the U.N. Secretariat took an active approach in 
collecting the national views of those engaged in the borrowing and lending 
of sovereign funds.  Third, on several occasions the Principles were 
discussed in open fora (inter alia General Assembly meetings, central 
bankers meetings, general auditors’ meetings, parliamentary conference, and 
debt managers conference) where participants were given the opportunity to 
speak for or against them.  Members of the civil society were not shy in 
voicing their concerns, particularly on the question of illegitimate debts.  
The fact that stakeholders with different, and sometimes contradictory, 
interests openly debated problems and possible remedies not only improved 
the information available,53 but also forced them to debate and argue their 
positions and look for feasible and balanced criteria to be accepted. 54  
Deliberation 55  also potentially generated new ways to advance the 
stakeholders’ goals through cooperation.56 
 
B. Legitimacy Through Explicit and Implicit Consent 
 
The idea of consent was not disregarded in formulating the Principles. 
Its significance remains important in two respects.  First, most of the 
Principles can be considered as general principles of international law.57  
Apart from the similarities between private and state insolvencies,58 there is 
a growing and broadening tendency to systematize principles distilled from 
domestic legal systems (especially taking Chapters 9 and 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code as models) in order to build a new sovereign insolvency 
architecture.  The notable similarities in domestic bankruptcy laws 
                                                     
52 Id. 
53 See Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 67, 69 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).   
54 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION. 
55 See generally Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POLITICAL THEORY 
338 (1987). 
56 Peter M. Haas & Ernst B. Haas, Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance, 1 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 255, 270 (1995). 
57 See generally Matthias Goldmann, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing: The View from 
Domestic Jurisdictions (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Working Paper February 
2012), available at http://www.unctad.info/upload/Debt%20Portal/RSLB_MGoldmann_02-2012.pdf. 
58 DOMINIQUE CARREAU, THE EXTERNAL DEBT 20 (1992). 
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facilitated the work to create the Southern Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(“SDRM”) proposed by the IMF in 2003, since, the standstill and approval 
of the reorganization plan are deeply-rooted institutions in domestic law.  A 
broad comparative survey that includes fifteen representative jurisdictions59 
indicates that while most of the Principles already can be regarded as general 
principles of law, the rest can be categorized as guiding, emerging or 
structural principles.60  In this sense, the creation of general principles of law 
through the transposition of widely shared domestic practices into the 
international legal context infers a degree of implicit consent.61 
Second, consent constitutes an essential means of making the 
Principles “implementable.”  States’ official declarations of support for the 
Principles (“endorsement”) is crucial for their influence in the international 
arena.  This is not because it would make them necessarily binding but 
because States’ communication reflects their credibility and legitimacy on 
the international scene as well as on the domestic one.  Consent does not 
work here as a legal instrument but as a political device belonging to 
reputational games that carry the weight of individuals’ and citizens’ scrutiny 
and tremendous potential for impact. 
 
C. Legitimacy Through Substantive Outcomes 
 
 Substantive legitimacy in the field of sovereign debt is strongly 
connected to objective ideals of justice, fairness, and human rights.  These 
ideals are all essential elements in the determination of substantive policy 
outcomes.  These outcomes are the product of multiple outputs generated at 
various levels of the policy arena.  At the macro level, policy makers 
consider theoretical approaches and ethical values to be assessed in the 
interpretation of general principles such as those included in constitutional 
laws, international conventions, or informal norms like the Principles.  At 
the micro level, which entails looking at each individual principle in the 
sovereign debt area, outcomes are measured against results (outputs) that 
should stem from the realization of the purpose and intent of such principles.  
Finally, at the meso level, outcomes are determined by the behavior (output) 
of the institutions and stakeholders in the pursuit of more responsible 
sovereign financing practices.  Naturally, all these outputs are a measure of 
                                                     
59 The legal orders examined were Egypt, Nigeria, Tanzania, China, India, Japan, Russian Federation, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States of America. 
60 Goldmann, supra note 57, at 8. 
61 On this function of the general principles, see M.C. Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to General 
Principles of International Law, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 768, 776 (1990); Elias Olufemi & Chin Lim, General 
Principles of Law, Soft Law and the Identification of International Law, 44 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 3,  (1997). 
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efficiency, and efficient outcomes are an important component of sustainable 
goals. 
Hence, beginning with the macro perspective, given the direct and 
positive impact that more responsible financial behaviors would have on 
economic growth and, consequently, on achieving the development goals,62 
the Principles can be viewed as generally functional and even as socially 
necessary.63 
From a micro perspective, the Principles purport to achieve general 
ethical goals through specific legal means.  First, lenders and borrowers 
should acknowledge the duty of government officials to protect public 
interest (of both the state and its citizens) (Principles 1 and 8).  Second, 
Principle 6 establishes that lenders must not participate in transactions that 
violate, evade, or hamper U.N. sanctions.  While this principle may seem 
obvious considering other international law norms, political and academic 
discussion on whether multilateral financial organizations are bound by the 
U.N. Security Council resolutions.64  Third, Principle 9 (a general principle 
of law) established that debts should be honored, unless the economic 
circumstances of the borrower prevents full or timely repayment, or if a 
judicial authority acknowledges a legal defense. 65   In case a debt 
restructuring is unavoidable, this should be proportional to the sovereign’s 
need and all stakeholders (including citizens) should share an equitable 
burden of adjustment or losses.66 
Other principles insist on the consideration of a large range of 
implications, beyond the purely economic concerns of the creditors and 
debtors in debt transactions.  For instance, when assessing project financing 
options, both lenders and borrowers should perform an ex ante and ex post 
investigation of the likely effects of the project, including its financial, 
operational, civil, social, cultural, and environmental implications. 67  
Another example lies in Principle 14, where it is stipulated that while 
                                                     
62 See KUNIBERT RAFFER, DEBT MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: PROTECTION OF THE POOR AND 
THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2010). 
63 Peters, supra note 35, at 539. 
64 See Samuel Bleicher, UN v. IBRD: A Dilemma of Functionalism, 24 INT’L ORGANIZATION 31, 
(1970); EISUKE SUZUKI, Responsibility of International Financial Institutions Under International Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 63, 69 (Daniel Bradlow & David 
Hunter eds., 2010). 
65 Two examples of these defenses are insolvency and corruption. 
66 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Consolidated Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Financing, Principle 15, http://www.unctad.info/upload/Debt%20Portal/Principles%20drafts 
/SLB_Principles_English_Doha_22-04-2012.pdf. 
67 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Consolidated Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Financing, Principles 5 and 12, http://www.unctad.info/upload/Debt%20Portal/Principles% 
20drafts/SLB_Principles_English_Doha_22-04-2012.pdf. 
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weighing costs and benefits of seeking sovereign loans, governments should 
consider if it would permit additional public or private investment, with a 
prospective social return at least equal to the likely interest rate.  These 
calculations should be performed after internalizing relevant social and 
environmental costs and benefits.  Because of its broad externalities, 
particularly for taxpayers, the process for obtaining financing and assuming 
sovereign debt obligations and liabilities should be transparent.68 
From a meso perspective, the Principles allocate responsibilities to 
lenders and borrowers according to those who are best suited to take action 
to prevent losses, seeking to approach the optimal liability.  In addition, the 
Principles reflect and reinforce the morality involved in each behavioral 
change they promote.  Fiduciary responsibilities are probably their best 
example of this.  As fair laws exert a compliance pull on states, the 
Principles seem to have a great potential in terms of implementation.  The 
Principles could trigger a change in both values and interests of stakeholders 
involved in sovereign financing.  Hence, since the externalities of the 
problems addressed by the Principles are reciprocal, successful cooperation 
is more likely.69 
Behavioral changes are subtle and engrained in the participatory 
process of the Principles’ elaboration.  It begins with the willingness of 
certain stakeholders, who would not in theory be open to a dialogue on 
certain aspects of sovereign debt transactions (e.g., creditors), to participate 
in the discussions.  Institutional responses of certain stakeholders—like that 
of the Institute of International Finance—in deciding to revise its own 
principles on sovereign debt, bear witness to the effective character of 
deliberative processes.70  More generally, the mandate granted by the U.N. 
General Assembly to work on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing 
shows a widespread consensus of the international community on the 
necessity to strengthen debt crisis prevention and management on a global 
basis.71 
Following the drafting process, the Principles took on a life of their 
own, influencing behaviors independently from UNCTAD initiatives.  First, 
                                                     
68 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Consolidated Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Financing, Principles 10 and 15, http://www.unctad.info/upload/Debt%20Portal/Principles%20 
drafts/ SLB_Principles_English_Doha_22-04-2012.pdf. 
69 Alan O. Sykes, The Inaugural Robert A. Kindler Professorship of Law Lecture: When is 
International Law Useful, 45 N.Y.U. J. INL’T L. & POL. 787, 810 (2013). 
70 In 2012, following numerous discussions among experts within the context of the Principles, the 
IIF decided to widen the target audience of its own principles from emerging countries to all countries.  
71 See Documentation on Responsible Sovereign Financing, UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.info/en/ 
Debt-Portal/Project-Promoting-Responsible-Sovereign-Lending-and-Borrowing/About-the-Project/Princip 
les-on-Responsible-Sovereign-Lending-and-Borrowing/Project-Documents/ (last visited May 30, 2015). 
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twelve member states endorsed the Principles, thereby indicating a 
willingness to be recognized as responsible borrowers and lenders at the 
international level.  Evolving attitudes with regard to the endorsement of 
Principles was also noted at the G20 level.  In 2013, under the Russian 
presidency, the Principles found a revived interest, leading UNCTAD to 
highlight the importance of having more countries recognize these Principles 
as a guiding tool in their economic and financial policies.72  The current 
efforts aimed at having all U.N. member states politically endorse the 
Principles through the Financing For Development (“FFD”) process bear 
witness to the consistent political consideration of this evolution on the 
international level. 
Notwithstanding the political relevance of the endorsement process, 
changing behaviors also need to be examined in light of implementing 
initiatives.  At this point, stakeholders have taken two major steps in this 
direction at the international level.  First, the International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions (“INTOSAI”) recently discussed the technical 
aspects of incorporating the Principles into the international standards used 
by Auditors General to audit their countries' public debt.73  This project, 
carried out by the INTOSAI Development Initiative (“IDI”) ensures that 
Auditors General from various countries will be trained with a view to audit 
sovereign debts in line with the Principles.  As a precursor of the initiative, 
Norway undertook an audit of developing countries’ debts to the country on 
the basis of the Principles. 74   Second, a dissenting opinion in a recent 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) 
arbitration decision on jurisdiction and admissibility mentioned the 
UNCTAD Principles as relevant law when deciding a dispute on public 
debt.75 
In addition, the spread of ideas potentially has the ability to shape 
what societies see as legitimate and acceptable. The U.N. can play a 
                                                     
72 Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, G20 High-Level Seminar 




73 Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Principles to Be 
Incorporated in Auditing Standards for Sovereign Debts - A Major Step Forward (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.unctad.info/en/Debt-Portal/News-Archive/Our-News/International-auditing-standards-to-
streamline-UNCTAD-Principles-on-sovereign-financing-21072013/. 
74 Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Norway to Audit Debt on 
Basis of UNCTAD Principles (Aug. 22, 2013), http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVers 
ionID=231. 
75 Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, ¶ 330 
(May 2, 2013) (Bernárdez, dissenting), available at www.italaw.com/cases/1750 (bondholders’ claims). 
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transcendental role in this particular regard.  Specifically, the U.N. General 
Assembly approved Resolution 68/304 in September 2014, establishing an 
Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate a multilateral legal framework for sovereign 
debt restructuring processes: 
 
Stressing the importance of the Principles on Promoting 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing issued by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on 4 
May 2011, which aim to reduce the prevalence of sovereign 
debt crises, prevent unsustainable debt situations, maintain 
steady economic growth and help achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals, encouraging to that end responsible 
sovereign borrowing.76 
 
UNCTAD is now the Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Committee established by 
the General Assembly (Resolution 69/247, December 2014) to implement 
Resolution 68/304.77 
Change in political discourse constitutes one of the ways to detect 
evolutions in legitimate perceptions.  With the Principles, a number of 
stakeholders started adopting the U.N. language in their work and sometimes 
even in their advocacy, thereby helping to reframe the debate on sovereign 
debt crisis prevention.  Terms like “responsible sovereign lending and 
borrowing” or “co-responsibility” clearly indicate an attempt to depart from 
the traditional policies focused solely on the borrowing countries and 
embrace the idea that lenders and borrowers are jointly responsible in the 
debt transactions they conclude.  The adoption of this idea in the U.N. 
General Assembly Resolution on External Debt (in 2010) 78  was then 
followed in other fora such as the ACP/EU trade negotiations79 and the Inter-
Parliamentarian Union. 80   Civil society representatives and scholars also 
played a crucial role in the dissemination of this language81. 
                                                     
76 G.A. Res. 68/304, U.N. DOC. A/68/L.57/Rev.2, at 3 (Sept. 4, 2014).    
77 See Debt Portal, UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.info/en/Debt-Portal/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
78 G.A. Res. 64/144, U.N. DOC. A/65/434/Add.3 (Dec. 3, 2010). 
79 Press Release, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Principles on Responsible 
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing Receive Parliamentary Support (Dec. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.unctad.info/en/Debt-Portal/News-Archive/Our-News/Parliamentary-Support-of-the-Principles-
on-Responsible-Sovereign-Lending-and-Borrowing-23112011/. 
80 See 125th IPU Assembly and Related Meetings (Oct. 16-19, 2011), INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, 
http://www.ipu.org/conf-e/125agnd.htm (last visited May 30, 2015). 
81 See generally European Network on Debt and Development [EURODAD], Responsible Finance 
Charter (2011), available at http://eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/charter_final_23-11.pdf. 
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The Principles have only been released for endorsement since April 
2012 and, consequently, their potential for implementation has yet to be fully 
realized. Like many policy and normative outputs, the initiating institution 
rapidly becomes detached from its output for the benefit of a better 
appropriation by the stakeholders in need of providing a direction or a 
framework to their activities.  In that respect, a study of changing lending 
and borrowing practices would be useful to get a sense of the breadth and 
financial sustainability of the Principles implementation.  While it is difficult 
to study how changing practices link directly with the Principles, monitoring 
legitimacy perceptions constitutes a recognized way of indicating 
substantive outcomes.  In terms of assessing legitimacy of international 
initiatives, this article provides for an illustration of why it is important to 
separate the analysis of the institution’s (here, the U.N.) legitimacy in 
issuing norms and the norms’ (here, the Principles) legitimacy itself.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The Principles integrate both procedural and substantive requirements 
of the norm making processes of informal law.  While some of these 
elements can also be associated with formal law’s legitimacy requirements, 
the particular attention paid to substantive outcomes makes this 
legitimization process informal-norm-specific.  This is particularly important 
given the need to consistently link the SDGs to adequate financial means.  
Informal law in the field of sovereign debt desperately needs good results 
that are development and human rights-oriented.  
On the one hand, robust discussions around the Principles 
strengthened their procedural legitimacy.  Expertise, participation, and 
deliberation promoted and facilitated balanced and feasible rules in the 
concrete case of the Principles. On the other hand, genuine and qualified 
discussions help identify and crystallize rules that find trade-offs among the 
behavioral changes sought by these same rules.  Making the Principles’ 
concrete applications visible and understandable from the very beginning 
constitutes a useful way of providing public goods more effectively and 
efficiently—and in line with the SDGs and human rights—consolidating 
their legitimacy.  
Legitimizing norms according to the above criteria is particularly 
suited to the area of sovereign debt due to the difficulty to obtain explicit 
inter-state consent in this field, as well as the number and power of non-state 
actors involved in sovereign lending and borrowing transactions.  This is in 
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fact reflected in the state of formulation of traditional sources of 
international law in the field. 
The draft General Assembly Resolution 68/34 initially submitted by 
the G-77 and China proposed the adoption of a multilateral convention. 
However, the text eventually adopted refers to efforts to establish not a 
multilateral convention, but a legal framework, echoing the call for a soft 
law approach.  In terms of impact, the development implications of having 
legitimate norms in sovereign debt governance matter.  For instance, the 
legitimacy of norms such as the Principles, which integrate (macro) financial 
sustainability as a key variable of norm efficiency, can in turn foster SDGs in 
a significant way.  Indeed, by placing individuals at the center of decision 
making processes, even indirectly through democratic means, and by 
holding the global general interest as a key consideration in sovereign debt 
dispute resolutions, the intensity of disasters linked with the repayment of 
unsustainable debts or, more generally, with irresponsible lending and 
borrowing may be reduced.  
The Principles are based on a productive interplay between 
constructivism and international legal theory.  While conscious of the 
political and economic constraints existing in the international financial 
arena, the Principles do not dominate weak stakeholders so that they follow 
the rules made by the most powerful.  On the contrary, the Principles 
reinforce sovereigns’ will by incorporating general principles already in 
existence in domestic orders and to which thus implicitly consented.  In 
addition, their general principles status implies that the Principles have been 
successfully tested at the domestic level, so that expectations from and 
familiarity with the Principles can potentially facilitate their adaptation and 
implementation at a global scale.  
